Obtener el consentimiento válido, libre e informado no siempre es fácil. Presupone, por un lado, la divulgación de información justa, clara y apropiada, y, por otro, la capacidad de comprenderla lo más adecuadamente posible y luego tomar una decisión. Entonces, cuando un paciente tiene impedimentos cognitivos en el largo plazo y carece de la capacidad independiente para tomar o comunicar una decisión, y cuando esta decisión se trata del final de su vida, el consentimiento puede ser muy complejo. ¿Cómo hacerlo (...) bien? El presente artículo no ofrece «la» solución, pero analiza el tema en el marco legal y ético francés. El desafío es encontrar una línea divisoria entre la beneficencia, el respeto a la autonomía y el rechazo de la «obstinación irrazonable» (que define lainutilidad en la legislación francesa). La beneficencia podría significar retirar (o retener) los tratamientos médicos en curso (quimioterapia, radioterapia, etcétera) cuando se vuelven cada vez más ineficaces y, además, son agresivos e intrusivos para el paciente (lo que conlleva una disminución de su calidad de vida). Pero cuando el paciente no puede consentir o parece estar en desacuerdo, ¿cómo podemos seguir adelante? La contribución examinará, primero, el valor de la toma de decisiones y del consentimiento del paciente en la atención médica y, luego, el papel que la familia y los cuidadores pueden desempeñar para apoyarlos. Dado que la muerte es un momento único y definitivo, no debemos olvidar que, a menudo, la experiencia de los familiares con el paciente condiciona tanto el proceso de toma de decisiones como su proceso de duelo. Finalmente, se examinarán y discutirán tres situaciones clínicas específicas, en las que se debe tomar una decisión con respecto a la retención y retirada de los tratamientos: cuando un paciente está consciente, cuando está inconsciente y no tiene instrucciones anticipadas, cuando rechaza el tratamiento a sabiendas. La lucha consiste en saber qué es lo que realmente le importa a la persona moribunda, para poder respetar sus deseos. (shrink)

This article discusses three main orientations in recent works of legal and political theory about the family-contract-based, community-based, and rights-based-and argues that none of these takes adequate account of two paradoxical features of family life and of the family's relationship to the state. A coherent political and legal theory of the family in the contemporary United States requires recognition of the relational rights and responsibilities intrinsic to family life.

L’article évoque les interrogations nouvelles autour de la responsabilité dans le domaine médical. Le caractère intolérable de la fragilité, le mouvement de médicalisation, l’individualisation de la perception des risques, l’évolution de la relation médecin-malade, etc., ont grandement complexifié la prise de décision et l’évaluation éthique en médecine et, plus largement, dans les questions relatives à la santé. L’Église catholique, comme toutes les institutions touchant de près ou de loin à la santé, ne manque pas d’être interrogée. La réflexion voudrait le (...) montrer à partir de l’épidémie de sida. Finalement, la responsabilité moderne ne se meut-elle pas nécessairement dans l’ambiguïté ? (shrink)

Shepherd propounds a theory of mind with a fair claim to be better than Hume’s at explaining the sources of commonly held human beliefs about causal necessity due largely to her relational theory of sense perception. In comparison with Hume’s account, it incorporates a more sophisticated treatment of mental representation, especially the role of relational structure and logical form. Most important, perhaps, Shepherd’s theory enforces the division, obscured by Hume, between the evidence of necessity and the metaphysical foundation of necessity.

Adherence to professional ethics in nursing is fundamental for high-quality ethical care. However, analysis of the use and impact of nurses’ codes of ethics as a part of professional ethics is limited. To fill this gap in knowledge, the aim of our review was to describe the use and impact of the Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive Statements published by the American Nurses Association as an example of one of the earliest and most extensive codes of ethics for (...) nurses with their interpretative statements and constituting a strong basis for the International Council of Nurses’ Code of Ethics for Nurses. We based our review on previous literature using a scoping review method. We included both non-scientific and scientific publications to provide an analysis of codes of ethics which can be utilized in development and revision of other nurses’ codes of ethics. In the searches, we used CINAHL and PubMed databases limiting publications to texts with a connection to the Code of Ethics for Nurses published from January 2001 to November 2022 and written in English. Searches yielded 1739 references, from which 785 non-scientific and 71 scientific publications were included for analysis of the data. Although non-scientific and scientific publications addressed different number of categories, the results indicated that in the both groups the use and impact focused on professional ethics, nursing practice, and work environment and less on education, research, or social health issues. Nurses’ ethical standards were not addressed in non-scientific publications, and clinical issues and leadership were not in focus in scientific publications. To increase evidence-based knowledge of the impact of codes of ethics additional research is needed. Good scientific conduct was followed. (shrink)

Nietzsche's use of metaphor has been widely noted but rarely focused to explore specific images in great detail. A Nietzschean Bestiary gathers essays devoted to the most notorious and celebrated beasts in Nietzsche's work. The essays illustrate Nietzsche's ample use of animal imagery, and link it to the dual philosophical purposes of recovering and revivifying human animality, which plays a significant role in his call for de-deifying nature.

Se situant au confluent du libéralisme politique rawlsien et de l’anthropologie néoaristotélicienne, l’approche des capabilités de Martha Nussbaum offre un cadre théorique permettant de répondre aux tensions multiculturelles. Cet article constitue une analyse détaillée de la réponse de Nussbaum à ces enjeux, qui prétend unir un pluralisme axiologique à un universalisme moral fort. Nous avancerons que la démarche entreprise par la philosophe porte une tension entre le libéralisme politique rawlsien et le cadre conceptuel apporté par la liste des capabilités. (...) Cette liste pose une difficulté par le déficit démocratique de ses fondements, n’intégrant pas suffisamment des normes d’inclusion et de représentation. Dans un dernier temps, nous tenterons de pallier ces problèmes en intégrant à l’approche de Nussbaum des exigences délibératives. (shrink)

Cet article traite de deux aspects de la nomination dans des communautés ashkénazes d’Autriche au Moyen Âge : d’une part, comme caractéristique identitaire quant à l’appartenance religieuse et, d’autre part, en relation avec le genre et l’assignation de genre. Diverses prescriptions juridiques et habitudes spécifiquement genrées pèsent en effet sur le port du nom : dans les sources historiques les hommes juifs sont repérés aussi bien par leur nom « sacré » hébreu que par leur prénom usuel, et éventuellement par (...) un surnom, alors qu’on ne repère le plus souvent les femmes que par leur prénom usuel. Selon le droit juif, les hommes produisent dans leur nom hébreu le nom de leur père ; les matronymes ne sont que rarement donnés, et tout au plus avec le prénom usuel. Les femmes, en revanche, s’identifient par le nom de leur mari. Quant aux noms affectueux et aux noms usuels, ils sont très comparables chez les enfants masculins et féminins. (shrink)

Cet article traite de deux aspects de la nomination dans des communautés ashkénazes d’Autriche au Moyen Âge : d’une part, comme caractéristique identitaire quant à l’appartenance religieuse et, d’autre part, en relation avec le genre et l’assignation de genre. Diverses prescriptions juridiques et habitudes spécifiquement genrées pèsent en effet sur le port du nom : dans les sources historiques les hommes juifs sont repérés aussi bien par leur nom « sacré » hébreu que par leur prénom usuel, et éventuellement par (...) un surnom, alors qu’on ne repère le plus souvent les femmes que par leur prénom usuel. Selon le droit juif, les hommes produisent dans leur nom hébreu le nom de leur père ; les matronymes ne sont que rarement donnés, et tout au plus avec le prénom usuel. Les femmes, en revanche, s’identifient par le nom de leur mari. Quant aux noms affectueux et aux noms usuels, ils sont très comparables chez les enfants masculins et féminins. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.3 (2000) 294-298 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Reclaiming Rhetorica: Women in the Rhetorical Tradition Listening to Their Voices: The Rhetorical Activities of Historical Women The Changing Tradition: Women in the History of Rhetoric Reclaiming Rhetorica: Women in the Rhetorical Tradition. Ed. Andrea A. Lunsford. Pittsburgh Series in Composition, Literacy, and Culture. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1995. Pp. xiv + 354. $22.95 paperback; $59.95 (...) cloth. Listening to Their Voices: The Rhetorical Activities of Historical Women. Ed. Molly Meijer Wertheimer. University of South Carolina Series in Rhetoric/Communication. Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 1997. Pp. xii + 408. NP. The Changing Tradition: Women in the History of Rhetoric. Ed. Christine Mason Sutherland and Rebecca Sutcliffe. Calgary, Alberta: U of Calgary P, 1999. Pp. 279. NP. These three books, all published within the last five years, are both reflections of and important contributions to the growing scholarship on women's roles in rhetorical history as theorists and as practitioners. Indeed, the titles listed in chronological order--Reclaiming Rhetorica, Listening to Their Voices, and The Changing Tradition--suggest the process of transformation that the study of rhetorical history has undergone in recent years. Both individually and together, these works are a healthful antidote to the rhetorical history most of us learned at our (male) professors' knees.The books share certain features. As edited volumes, they span rhetorical history, from its classical roots to modern feminist theories. Although some figures appear more than once in different volumes (e.g., Aspasia and Mary Astell), the constraints of brief chapters permit us only tantalizing glimpses of each woman and her activities. Like all edited collections, these books include a variety of viewpoints and voices. Despite the disparity that is inevitable in a collection of essays, the quality of the work in these volumes is uniformly high. The editors of all three collections have done a nice job of assuring that the contributors stay to the point and write well without sacrificing scholarly precision. For those seeking a simple history or detailed analysis of any particular figure or time, these books will not suffice. But for most readers who are unfamiliar with the full range [End Page 294] of women in rhetorical history, this reader among them, these volumes provide a delightful introduction to the resilience, creativity, and significance of women in our formerly unacknowledged rhetorical past.In her introduction to Reclaiming Rhetorica, Andrea Lunsford shares the intriguing history of the volume, which explains its eclecticism and its goals. Approached by students who wanted to explore the role of women in rhetorical history, Annette Kolodny offered a two-semester graduate seminar titled "Women Rhetoricians." For the class, the students did extensive archival recovery research, much of which is included in the published volume. Interestingly, the students were the ones who persisted in trying to bring their works, plus the other contributors' efforts, to publication. The resultant book is, then, as James J. Murphy says in his foreword, "not a history of women rhetoricians, or women orators, or women writers. It is, instead, a glimmer of possibilities, an array of glances,--an enthymeme."The essays range widely in time covered and in focus. For example, the first chapter is a consideration of Aspasia, who left no written record of her own. Her accomplishments and influence must, then, be constructed from references to her in the works of others. The authors, Susan Jarratt and Rory Ong, contend that both her gender and her non-Athenian roots played a role in the suppression of her memory. Returning to the theme of "dangerous femininity," the concluding chapter explores the work of a modern theorist, Julia Kristeva. In that chapter, Suzanne Clark demonstrates how Kristeva has challenged traditional notions of rhetoric and provides dialogism as an antidote to the constraints of earlier approaches to human interaction. The chapters between these two take a variety of directions. Mary Wollstonecraft's feminist dialogics stands alongside of the autobiographical The... (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum endorses a kind of humanist feminism, which (for her) involves articulating the notion of human being as a normative ethical concept: once this normative concept is articulated, it can be employed to pick out those modes of treating women that are inappropriate with the view to developing corrective public policies. Contra Nussbaum, Louise Antony argues that human being cannot be defined in a normative sense. For Antony, the only plausible human universals are biological or genetic traits, which (...) lack the required ethical component. This, in Antony’s view, undermines humanist feminism because the prospects of cashing out an ethically normative concept of human being are not good. However, I argue this doesn’t undercut humanist feminism. Instead, feminists can single out inappropriate modes of treating women by developing a politically useful notion of dehumanization. My strategy takes rape to be a paradigm case of dehumanizing treatment and examines what key features make it dehumanizing. These key features, then, can be used to develop a general account of dehumanization. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. — This article examines the concept of adaptive preference as it has appeared in feminist political philosophy since the 2000’s. This concept refers to preferences shaped in compliance with an oppressive environment and that jeopardizes one’s well-being. In the first part, the two most influential conceptions of adaptive preference will be discussed : the ones provided by the philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Serene Khader. Afterwards, I will assess these conceptions in the light of recent work by feminist anthropologists (...) Saba Mahmood and Lila Abu-Lughod, in which they revaluate the political project of feminist philosophy underlying adaptive preferences. -/- RÉSUMÉ. — Cet article porte sur le concept de préférence adaptative tel qu’il est apparu en philosophie féministe politique et anglophone depuis les années 2000. Ce concept désigne les préférences formées conformément à un milieu oppressif et qui vont à l’encontre du bien-être. Dans un premier temps, il sera question des deux théorisations les plus influentes à l’heure actuelle: celles développées par les philosophes Martha Nussbaum et Serene Khader. Ensuite, j’évaluerai ces positions à l’aune des récents travaux des anthropologues fémi- nistes Saba Mahmood et Lila Abu-Lughod, dans lesquels elles remettent en question le projet politique de la philosophie féministe sous-jacent aux préfé- rences adaptatives. (shrink)

This essay examines Martha Nussbaum's prescription fortempering retribution with mercy in the capitalsentencing process. Nussbaum observes that theoperation of retribution in the ancient world resultedin harsh and indiscriminate punishment without regardto the particularities of the offender and his crime. In the interest of mercy, Nussbaum advocates the useof the novel as a model for a more compassionatesentencing process. An examination of Nussbaum's``novel prescription'' reveals that the retribution thatoperates in the modern criminal law, and in theSupreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence,already (...) accommodates the values of justice –individuation, particularization, and proportionality– that are characteristic of the mercy tradition. Moreover, the rich narrative approach that Nussbaumfavors is by no means congenial to mercifulpunishment. Because the particularistic detail of thenovel form is not confined to the sympatheticportrayal of the defendant, the emotionalism thatNussbaum urges encompasses as well emotional detailsabout the characteristics of the defendant's victim. Such victim impact evidence is consistent with thenovel form, but is unlikely to promote mercifuljudgment. Instead, the details of victim impactevidence can be expected to exacerbate a sentencingauthority's inclination to judge a capital defendantharshly. The novel thus provides a poor model for thecapital sentencing process because it fosters the sortof unchecked emotionalism that undermines the rationaldecision making that the Supreme Court has sought toachieve. (shrink)

This article clarifies how the freedom of thought as a human right can be understood and promoted as a right of mental health service users, especially people with psychotic disorder, by using Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Fulford’s and Fulford et al ’s values-based practice. According to Nussbaum, freedom of thought seems to primarily protect the capability to think, believe and feel. This capability can be promoted in the context of mental health services by values-based practice. The article points (...) out that both Nussbaum’s approach and values-based practice recognise that people’s values differ. The idea of involving different actors and service users in mental healthcare is also common in both Nussbaum’s approach and values-based practice. However, there are also differences in that values-based practice relies on a ‘good process’ in decision-making, whereas the capabilities approach is oriented towards a ‘right outcome’. However, since process and outcome are linked with each other, these two approaches do not necessarily conflict despite this difference. The article suggests that absolute rights are possible within the two approaches. It also recognises that the capabilities approach, values-based practice and human rights approach lean on liberal values and thus can be combined at least in liberal societies. (shrink)

This article clarifies how the freedom of thought as a human right can be understood and promoted as a right of mental health service users, especially people with psychotic disorder, by using Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Fulford’s and Fulford _et al_’s values-based practice. According to Nussbaum, freedom of thought seems to primarily protect the capability to think, believe and feel. This capability can be promoted in the context of mental health services by values-based practice. The article points out (...) that both Nussbaum’s approach and values-based practice recognise that people’s values differ. The idea of involving different actors and service users in mental healthcare is also common in both Nussbaum’s approach and values-based practice. However, there are also differences in that values-based practice relies on a ‘good process’ in decision-making, whereas the capabilities approach is oriented towards a ‘right outcome’. However, since process and outcome are linked with each other, these two approaches do not necessarily conflict despite this difference. The article suggests that absolute rights are possible within the two approaches. It also recognises that the capabilities approach, values-based practice and human rights approach lean on liberal values and thus can be combined at least in liberal societies. (shrink)

A critical review of Martha Nussbaum's 2016 book, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REDISCOVERING VIRTUE* SERVAIS PINCK.AERS, 0.P. L!universite de Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATE ABOUT VIRTUE VIRTUE is back. Especially in the United States, a widespread discussion about its role in moral theology has been initiated, a discussion modeled on Aristotle's Ethics, particularly as Aristotle's thought was developed in the Middle Ages by Thomas Aquinas. Accompanying this rediscovery of virtue is a criticism of modern ethical theories. These theories, having (...) broken with Aristotelian tradition, have led to a burgeoning of contradictory systems: a morality of obligation on the Kantian model; utilitarian morality; and a radical critique of morality by Nietzsche. Because of such divergences any discussion between moralists, especially where the foundations and principles of morality are involved, has up to the present seemed doomed to failure.1 •Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. 1 The author who has contributed most to this discussion of virtue is undoubtedly Alasdair Macintyre in his three principal books: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; second edition, 1984); Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1988); Three Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and 1radition (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1990). The Italian edition of the last book, Enciclopedia, Genealogia e 1radizione (Milan, 1993), includes a special introduction on Macintyre and a biography. I should also like to mention the article by Martha Nussbaum, "Virtue Revived," Times Literary Supplement 4657 Ouly 3, 1992): 9-11. See also a recent book by Andre Comte-Sponville, Petit traite des grands vertus (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995). This work is very interesting because it proposes to a wide readership a moral system drawn from Aristotle that is at the same time based entirely on modern philosophy. In my opinion the author unintentionally confirms the thesis of the incompatibility of modern ethical systems of obligation and the 361 362 SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P. In view of this ethical pluralism, certain philosophers have undertaken to set up ethical norms through reflection on justice, using the methods of discussion and decision prevalent in our democratic societies. The initiative has been designated as procedural ethics.2 In this rather chaotic situation, other writers have thought a return to Aristotelian ethics opportune-a move that would enable us to reconnect with the long tradition of virtue-based morality represented therein, while bringing it up to date. In fact, the introduction of the concept of virtue offers many opportunities for the shaping of a morality that takes the human person into account. Virtue is a dynamic human quality acquired through education and personal effort. It forms character and assures continuity in action. Furthermore, it is set within the framework of community and a strong tradition, to whose development it contributes. Teaching on virtue would seem to be a good corrective for excessive individualism. This is what the socalled "communitarian" trend has emphasized.3 The debate on virtue has also surfaced within traditional Catholic teaching. Since the first half of this century, under the inspiration of St. Thomas, several authors of moral theology textbooks have undertaken to reorganize special morality on the basis of the virtues rather than the ten commandments, as had been done since the seventeenth century.4 Admittedly, the change Aristotelian construct of the virtues held by Macintyre. With the moderns he rejects a natural foundation for morality, within man, and thus robs the virtues he treats of their deep roots. Virtue is not spontaneous; it remains voluntaristic. 2 To mention a few titles: K. 0. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1981); Apel, Ethique de la discussion (Paris, 1994); J.M. Ferry, Philosophie de la communication (Paris, 1994); Jiirgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handeln, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1981); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikativer Handeln (Frankfurt, 1983); John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Harvard, 1971). 3 See, for example: J. H. Joder, Jesus et le politique: La radicalite ethique de la croix (Lausanne, 1984); S. Hauerwas, The Peacable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, 1983); W. Reese-Schafer, Was ist Kommunitarismus? (Frankfurt, 1994); Charles Taylor, The Sources ofthe Self: The Making ofthe Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass., 1989... (shrink)

This essay examines Martha Nussbaum's prescription for tempering retribution with mercy in the capital sentencing process. Nussbaum observes that the operation of retribution in the ancient world resulted in harsh and indiscriminate punishment without regard to the particularities of the offender and his crime. In the interest of mercy, Nussbaum advocates the use of the novel as a model for a more compassionate sentencing process. An examination of Nussbaum's ``novel prescription'' reveals that the retribution that operates in the modern (...) criminal law, and in the Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence, already accommodates the values of justice –individuation, particularization, and proportionality – that are characteristic of the mercy tradition. Moreover, the rich narrative approach that Nussbaum favors is by no means congenial to merciful punishment. Because the particularistic detail of the novel form is not confined to the sympathetic portrayal of the defendant, the emotionalism that Nussbaum urges encompasses as well emotional details about the characteristics of the defendant's victim. Such victim impact evidence is consistent with the novel form, but is unlikely to promote merciful judgment. Instead, the details of victim impact evidence can be expected to exacerbate a sentencing authority's inclination to judge a capital defendant harshly. The novel thus provides a poor model for the capital sentencing process because it fosters the sort of unchecked emotionalism that undermines the rational decision making that the Supreme Court has sought to achieve. (shrink)

In his painting of Martha and Mary Magdalene, Caravaggio depicted the two sisters of Lazarus as engaged in a serious conversation. On the one hand Martha is rebuking Mary Magdalene. On the other hand, Mary is responding in that she turns a mirror towards her older sister. The aim of this article is to elucidate how this reciprocal conversation reflects post-Trent propaganda. Martha represents a group of believers that remained within the Catholic Church but (...) did not embrace the changes implemented by the leaders of the Catholic Reformation. Mary Magdalene represents the reformed church that acknowledged, accepted, and implemented the decisions of the Council of Trent. The difference between the two sisters is not in their faith. They differ in their reaction. For Martha, faith was blind. For Mary Magdalene faith is an outcome of the deeds of Christ. Martha believed in Christ and continued to act according to tradition. Magdalene’s reaction is related to gaining knowledge and change, which is what the Catholic Reformation is all about. (shrink)

Do the rich descriptions and narrative shapings of literature provide a valuable resource for readers, writers, philosophers, and everyday people to imagine and confront the ultimate questions of life? Do the human activities of storytelling and complex moral decision-making have a deep connection? What are the moral responsibilities of the artist, critic, and reader? What can religious perspectives—from Catholic to Protestant to Mormon—contribute to literary criticism? Thirty well known contributors reflect on these questions, including iterary theorists Marshall Gregory, James Phelan, (...) and Wayne Booth; philosophers Martha Nussbaum, Richard Hart, and Nina Rosenstand; and authors John Updike, Charles Johnson, Flannery O'Connor, and Bernard Malamud. Divided into four sections, with introductory matter and questions for discussion, this accessible anthology represents the most crucial work today exploring the interdisciplinary connections between literature, religion and philosophy. (shrink)